Impact of transmission cost on Age of Information at Nash equilibrium in random-based medium access
Leonardo Badia, Associate professor at University of Padova, Italy
External Presentation (External Speaker)
Random-based medium access protocols are often considered inefficient and unstable from a game theoretic perspective, because the players (i.e., the transmitters) want to maximize their individual utility and so they tend to be very aggressive, which causes collisions. Generally, this is limited by introducing a cost for the transmission. However, if each player’s objective is high throughput, the aggressiveness is only partially limited as the resulting equilibrium is inefficient. We show that, if the objective shifts to age-of-information, the resulting equilibrium can become more efficient. Interesting, this has some simple analytical formulation in basic protocols like slotted ALOHA, but becomes still valid in more advanced techniques where irregular-repetition or capture-effect is inserted.
About Leonardo Badia
Leonardo Badia received both the Laurea degree (summa cum laude) in electrical engineering and the Ph.D. in information engineering (with highest mark) from the University of Ferrara, in 2000 and 2004, respectively. In March 2011 he joined the faculty of the University of Padova, where he is presently an Associate Professor. Leonardo Badia also held several research and teaching collaborations at various titles (lecturing and/or participations to research projects) with the Italian Universities of Padova, Pisa, Ferrara, the IMT Advanced Studies Institute in Lucca, and the Consorzio Ferrara Ricerche, Italy. He is author of more than 170 scientific papers published in international peer-reviewed journals or conferences.
This event will be conducted in English